published 09/14/1999



The Class Of 1995
Twenty biotech companies completed IPOs in 1995, yet where are they now? They entered the real world in a time of plenty, but today they're trying to exist in a much harsher climate. Some have disappeared, and others have changed so much that they're hard to recognize. The stories of four of the 20 -- GelTex, Sonus, Pharmacopeia and Myriad Genetics -- demonstrate just how each has matured and dealt with the challenges of growing a company and a business.

Have you ever thumbed through your high school yearbook and wondered what became of the fellow members of your graduating class? They all had great aspirations: One person was voted most likely to succeed; another to become a millionaire by the age of 25. Then there were the off-beat categories -- first in the class to climb Mt. Everest, for instance, or to become the president of a small banana republic. Outrageous prophesies aside, these bright and shining students were ready to take on the world. And, for the most part, they did. Some succeeded beyond anyone's expectations and others failed miserably, but the majority survived by accommodating themselves to the world as it changed around them.

So, too, it was with the biotech Class of '95 -- 20 young companies that entered the marketplace for the first time by completing IPOs. Today, 12 are easily identifiable by name alone, six have been acquired and two have changed their identities. But almost without exception, each has gone through significant -- even remarkable -- transformations since 1995. Business plans that once made perfect sense have been torn apart and rewritten; product development hitches have forced some companies to reassess their goals; and a few simply ran out of money before they could fulfill their dreams. (Short synopses for each of those companies, listed in chronological order by IPO date, are scattered throughout this article.)


The 20 originals chose a tough -- but exciting -- year to enter the real world. Investors were not enthusiastic about biotech stocks -- they hadn't shown much interest in IPOs since mid-1994 and continued to give biotech the cold shoulder through the late spring of 1995. There were a few exceptions here -- OncorMed Inc. completed an IPO in September 1994 and both Sugen Inc. and Phoenix International Life Sciences Inc. (now known as: MDS Pharma Services) came public in October of that year. (Two -- OncorMed and Sugen -- have since been acquired.) In January 1995, sensing a narrow slit in the financing window, three companies -- SunPharm Corp., Panax Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. (now InKine Pharmaceutical Co. Inc.) and Ostex International Inc. -- pulled off IPOs. But that was it -- until June 1995.

Then, the financing window flew wide open and stayed that way for nearly two years. The biotech companies that completed IPOs in the last half of 1995, especially, were leading this new rally. But, in retrospect, all members of the class of '95 had managed to enter the public domain just as Wall Street's interest in biotech stocks was heating up again. In fact, biotechs were able to raise more money through public offerings (both initial and follow-on) in the third quarter of 1995 than they had in any other quarter since that perfectly wonderful year of 1991. As it turned out, 1996 was pretty fabulous, too. What an auspicious beginning for the class of '95.



But nothing lasts forever. As the newly public firms went about establishing solid underpinnings for their fledgling businesses, external forces were also at work. The financing environment went from hot to cold and back again as investors fell in and out of love with biotech stocks. Today, many companies, including those from the class of '95, are still feeling the effects of Wall Street's latest rebuff -- even though there could be a new rally in the making. If that's so, then there are a few newly public biotech companies -- VaxGen Inc. and BioMarin Pharmaceutical Inc., for example -- which are leading the way. What will these companies, and the IPO-hopefuls yet to come this year, look like in four years? Will they be forever altered, as are most of the members of the class of '95? Perhaps -- there's no telling what future events will shape these companies. But one thing's for sure -- without capital, even a company with the ultimate pharmacogenomic technology or the hottest new drug candidate for diabetes in the last 50 years can't hope to survive.

In that way, the companies that comprise the biotech class of '95 are little different than those that came before or after. Their stories are universal, though the details change. Because it's beyond the scope of this article -- or the reader's endurance -- to explore the histories of each of the 20, we've picked four. They include two product-oriented companies -- GelTex Pharmaceuticals Inc. and Sonus Pharmaceuticals Inc. -- and two technology platform firms -- Pharmacopeia Inc. and Myriad Genetics Inc. Or, at least, that's how they were focused when they came public. But where are they now?


GelTex, for one, is right where it wanted to be. In fact, it might be the only member of the class of '95 that's actually stuck to the original business plan. "When we wrote the IPO prospectus, Renagel and Cholestagel [the company's lead products] were both in development," explained Mark Skaletsky, GelTex's president and CEO. Today, Renagel's an FDA-approved product and the NDA on Cholestagel has been submitted (in July 1999).

In November 1995, when GelTex completed its IPO, Renagel, a non-absorbed polymer hydrogel-based-drug, was in Phase II trials for reducing serum phosphorus in patients with end-stage renal disease. GelTex had already signed up a marketing partner for the product: In December 1994, Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. agreed to develop, sell and market the product in Japan and the Pacific Rim. Moreover, by the time GelTex went public, it had completed Phase I trials on its second product, Cholestagel (also a non-absorbed polymer, for reducing cholesterol) and Phase IIs were underway.

"Our initial strategy was to demonstrate that the technology [contributed by company founder George Whitesides, a professor at Harvard University] worked in vivo," Skaletsky said. "We also wanted to remain a nearly virtual company," he added. That meant a limited involvement in clinical trials per se, no large-scale manufacturing and no commercial activities. Those were the goals back in 1995 -- and it's still the way the company operates. "We have a small clinical group (about eight people) and work mainly with CROs. We have partnerships for manufacturing [The Dow Chemical Co. and Austria's Chemie Linz] and for commercial activities."

Company
IPO Date; 
Share (Unit) Price; Post-IPO Market Cap
Current Status
Details
Current Share 
Price; Market 
Cap (9/1/99)
Products; Programs
SunPharm Corp.
(NASDAQ:SUNP)
1/12/95;
$7.00 (unit);
$19M
Acquired
To be acquired by GelTex Pharmaceuticals in a stock swap valued at $16.5M (announced 8/99; completion expected 4Q:99)
$1.72;
$11.9M
Lead drug candidate DENSPM in Phase II trial; 2nd drug candidate DEHOP in Phase II trial
Panax Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. (NASDAQ:PANX)
1/18/95;
$5.00 (unit);
$15M
Name changed to
InKine Pharmaceutical Co. Inc. (NASDAQ:INKP)
Panax acquired CorBec Pharmaceuticals Inc. and merged with Sangen Pharmaceutical Co. (5/97-11/97), after which it changed the company name and trading symbol
For InKine Pharmaceutical:
$1.75;
$40M
Completed Phase III trial on lead drug candidate Diacol; 2nd drug candidate CBP-1011 in Phase III trial
Ostex International Inc.  (NASDAQ:OSTX)
1/25/95;
$9.50;
$114M
Unchanged
N/A
$1.06;
$13.3M
Two Osteomark NTx assays approved by FDA (5/95; 2/99)
OraVax Inc.
(NASDAQ:ORVX)
6/8/95;
$10.00;
$69M
Acquired
Acquired by Peptide Therapeutics Group plc for $20M in stock and cash (11/98-5/99)
N/A
OraVax contributed four drug candidates in development (two of them in clinical trials) and ChimeriVax technology platform


In June 1997, GelTex formed a 50/50 joint venture with Genzyme Corp. for the final development and ultimate marketing of Renagel Capsules worldwide (save those territories already claimed in the Chugai deal). The product was approved by the FDA in late October 1998 and launched early this year. The joint venture recorded sales of $7.6 million for the first six months of 1999. Although GelTex and Genzyme share the profits, they aren't enough yet to bring GelTex into profitability: for the quarter ended June 30, 1999, the Waltham, MA company reported a net loss of $0.56 per share. Still, it's got close to $78.5 million in cash, cash equivalents and marketable securities. Geltex's stock has bounced around over the years -- like so many other biotech firms' -- but at least it's trading above the IPO price -- unlike many others, including members of the class of '95 (see the company synopses in this article).

"We asked whether we could get a return for the shareholders by partnering products for commercial introduction rather than selling the product ourselves," Skaletsky said. "The answer was yes, at least for one product." However, he continued, GelTex reconsiders this last point -- whether or not to create its own sales force -- every time it begins a new product development program. There may come a time when the company has enough marketable products that it would warrant the additional -- and considerable -- expense of adding a sales and marketing unit.

GelTex Logo
GelTex's product development pipeline is by no means empty -- aside from Cholestagel, there are programs underway in infectious diseases and obesity. -- and it's just taken a major step to ensure that will be the case for years to come. In mid-August, GelTex announced its intention to acquire tiny SunPharm Corp. (also, by the way, a member of the class of '95; see the synopsis) in an all-stock transaction valued at $16.5 million. SunPharm's got two drug candidates in the clinic and various small molecule targets directed at the gastrointestinal tract -- like GelTex's. SunPharm's main attractions, however, are its polyamine and iron chelator technologies -- developed by Raymond Bergeron of the University of Florida. (SunPharm, based in Ponte Vedra Beach, FL, has exclusive licenses to the technologies.) SunPharm is planning to file two INDs for polyamine-based drugs yet this year and two more in its iron chelation program in the next 12 months. "It's a nice fit with our technology and it's a way to increase the size of our pipeline without taxing ourselves," Skaletsky explained. Plus, there's the considerable benefit of being able to work with Bergeron, who's "a leader in this area."



Through it all, GelTex has remained a small company (with about 110 employees), in keeping with the original vision. "We really view ourselves as a product development company," Skaletsky said. "We raised about $28 million in the IPO and we said that money would fund the company for two years. But about six months later, when the stock had risen to $22 [the IPO price was $10 per share], we went out again, and raised another $60 million [in May 1996]. Because of this second financing, we were able to keep the products longer, through late-stage development, and create real value for them." Plus, the company was able to control the developmental timeline for its first products. In fact, GelTex took RenaGel through to the NDA submission itself, and has done the same thing with Cholestagel. "There aren't too many biotech companies our size that can say that," he concluded.


Like GelTex, Sonus Pharmaceuticals had a product in the clinic and a partnership for marketing that product in Japan well before it went public. And, like GelTex, Sonus' first product, the fluorocarbon-based ultrasound contrast agent EchoGen, has gained marketing approval. But here the similarities end, for EchoGen's approved for sale in the European Union -- not the U.S. -- and even so, it's not yet on the market. The reasons for this are complex, and center on regulatory issues with the FDA, not the lack of a strong marketing partner -- which Sonus has in Abbott Laboratories. (Sonus parted ways with its Japanese marketing partner,
Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., last November.) Meanwhile, a competitive perfluorocarbon-based contrast agent (Optison) developed by Molecular Biosystems Inc. (and marketed by Mallinckrodt Inc.) is already on the U.S. market, having received the FDA's approval in January 1998.

"Our experience is a good lesson in the vagaries and uncertainties of dealing with the FDA," explained Michael Martino, the president and CEO of the Bothell, WA company. It's been a full three years since Sonus submitted its NDA on EchoGen (in September 1996) -- and FDA approval is still pending. Indeed, some of Sonus' regulatory nightmares are related to aspects of the NDA itself -- the FDA has twice told the company that it needed additional information before it could complete its review of the application. But others -- which have played a major role in the timing -- are directly connected to the type of application that Sonus filed. It comes down to a matter of definition: Is an ultrasound contrast agent a drug or a device?

Today, it's standard policy that the FDA regulates these agents as drugs, not devices. But two years ago, it was the subject of lawsuits and citizens' petitions. For, at the time, the agency had received marketing applications of both types from the various companies that were seeking approval of ultrasound contrast agents. This situation created a real conflict, for the agency's criteria for an approvable device are far less burdensome than those for a drug. To Sonus and the other companies that had submitted drug applications, this playing field needed some leveling. And they got it -- but at a cost. For, while the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued an injunction which essentially forced the FDA to respond to citizens' petitions (filed by Sonus and others) and decide once and for all how it would regulate ultrasound contrast agents, the regulatory review clock stopped cold.

Company
IPO Date;  Share (Unit) Price; Post-IPO Market Cap
Current Status
Details
Current Share 
Price; Market 
Cap (9/1/99)
Products; Programs
Metra Biosystems Inc.
(NASDAQ:MTRA)
6/30/95;
$10.00;
$94M
Acquired
Acquired by Quidel Corp. for $23M in all-cash tender offer (6/99-8/99)
N/A
Metra contributed 14 immuno-diagnostic products for osteoporosis (clinical/research use)
Sequana Therapeutics Inc.
(NASDAQ:SQNA)
7/31/95; $9.00; $71M
Merger
Merged with Arris Pharmaceutical Corp. in $119M stock swap (11/97-1/98); new company named Axys Pharmaceuticals Inc. (NASDAQ:AXPH)
N/A
Sequana contributed its subsidiary NemaPharm Inc. and genomics technologies
Ansan Inc.
(NASDAQ:ANSN)
8/8/95; $5.00 (unit); $14M
Reverse merger
Reverse merger with Discovery Laboratories Inc., valued at $2.5M (7/97-11/97), by which Discovery became a public company (NASDAQ:DSCO)
For Discovery Laboratories:
$1.38; $5.5M
Ansan contributed two drug development programs (Apafant and AN10)
OncoRx Inc.
(NASDAQ:OCRX)
8/14/95; $4.00 (unit); $32M
Name changed to Vion Pharmaceuticals Inc.
(NASDAQ:VION)
Name changed to settle lawsuit with Oncor Inc. (4/96)
For Vion Pharmaceuticals:
$5.31;
$80.8M
Drug candidate Promycin in Phase III clinical trial; drug candidate Triapine in Phase I trial


Once the FDA had determined that it would regulate these products as drugs, and the injunction had been lifted, it resumed its review of Sonus' NDA on EchoGen. Since then (August 1997), there have been a number of other hitches in the approval process: "In late 1997 the FDA told us that we did not need to have an advisory panel meeting on our product…and we publicized that," explained Gregory Sessler, Sonus' CFO. But in February 1998, "Sonus received a dramatic surprise -- a not approvable letter [from the FDA]. The issues centered primarily in the area of methodology in which the clinical data were analyzed and other issues, including manufacturing," he explained. Sonus addressed these points, submitted an amendment to its NDA in August 1998 and additional requested information in October. This time the agency accepted it for review. By April 1999, Sonus had received an approvable letter, but this, too, had conditions. "We expect to submit the final response by the end of this quarter [3Q:99]," Sessler said.



The regulatory delays in the U.S. had far-reaching implications -- including for the European launch of the product, where it was approved for sale in July 1998. "One of the issues [brought up in the FDA's 1998 action letter] was manufacturing, related to the validation of the sterility of the product," Sessler said. Sonus' manufacturing partner is Abbott; to address FDA's concerns, Abbott ended up "changing the manufacturing process slightly to address the validation concerns." These changes have met with the FDA's approval -- but "they put us in an awkward position with the European filing. The manufacturing process that the Europeans approved was the one that the FDA turned down." And, when Abbott changed the manufacturing process, it became one that was now no longer approved in Europe. "We didn't think it would be prudent to submit a new process to the European agency until we were comfortable that the FDA would be OK with the changes. After we got the approvable letter, we submitted variations on the process to the European agency." As of now, two out of three of those variations have been approved, Sessler said, and the third is pending. The delay in European product launch has had another consequence: in January 1999 Sonus and Abbott amended their marketing agreements to redefine future milestone payments (although the aggregate remains unchanged).

Sonus Logo
All the hassle has eaten up the firm's cash and forced it to think in new directions for the future. The various payments from Abbott (and, until the end of 1998, from Daiichi) have kept Sonus on its feet. At the end of 1998, Sonus reported that it had received $23 million from Abbott under its U.S. agreement and $12.6 million under the non-U.S. agreement. Sonus also got $12.8 million in license, option and milestone fees from Daiichi over the course of that agreement (which was signed in March 1995 and terminated in November 1998). "We haven't been back to the well since the IPO," Sessler said. "The Abbott collaboration has funded the company through this point."


Today, Sonus is applying its technology to the development of drug delivery systems (where R&D started in 1997) as well as ultrasound contrast agents. "Our core competency is our ability to formulate, scale up and manufacture emulsions," Sessler explained. "We've taken that art of making emulsions to see if we can reformulate therapeutic compounds that have known stability challenges," he continued. One obvious choice is paclitaxel (the active ingredient in Bristol-Myers Squibb's Taxol). "Bristol-Myers' formulation [which is an infusion] has toxicity in its own right," Sessler said. "We've used our emulsion technology to develop a friendlier formulation." Sonus has already done extensive pre-clinical work on its version of paclitaxel and is putting together "an IND package," he added. The company is also working with other compounds that are hard to solubilize, but Sessler declined to name them. In general, however, "We're looking at existing marketed drugs that are approaching or already off patent." The other direction is to explore compounds that big pharma might have in the early stages of R&D "but are presenting formulation problems."

This is a transition period for Sonus -- and even before that transition's complete, it's clearly not the same company that came public in October 1995. "We've broadened our horizons since the time of the IPO, when we were squarely in ultrasound contrast," Sessler said. The incorporation of drug delivery applications into its technology platform will require a different business plan, too. "We were involved in all phases of EchoGen development," Sessler said. "It was a fairly broad role. In drug delivery systems, however, the role is narrower." Sonus intends to seek multiple partners so that it can apply the technology broadly, he added. Sonus would then be involved in the earlier phases of a project but will probably play a limited role in clinical development and not get involved in manufacturing or marketing. And although "drug delivery is a different end-market game," commented CEO Martino, "It's not a step-out for us, it's an extension of our technology base." Martino said that "we continue to believe that the ultrasound contrast market potential for EchoGen is significant," but beyond that lies the realm of drug delivery. The key here, Martino added, "is to create sustainable value for Sonus' investors through significant partnerships." And, he said, "Over the next 6-12 months, investors will be looking at a significantly different company."


Pharmacopeia, too, is different than it was when it completed its IPO in December 1995. At that time, combinatorial chemistry was a red-hot area. The major drug companies, in particular, were keenly interested in it, for the technology promised to boost the pace of new drug discovery to unheard-of speeds and reduce the cost dramatically. These awesome changes became a "paradigm shift" in the drug discovery process -- and that abused phrase will never be the same again.

Pharmacopeia, of Princeton, NJ, was one of the first combinatorial chemistry companies to grab the spotlight, and it's had to work hard to retain that position. Like many platform technologies in this fast-moving world, combinatorial chemistry has moved into the "commodity" category. Faced with growing competition from big pharma companies -- many of which have established their own in-house expertise by now -- and a multitude of biotech firms, Pharmacopeia has still managed to maintain its pre-eminence in this field. How has it done so?

Company
IPO Date; 
Share (Unit) Price; Post-IPO Market Cap
Current Status
Details
Current Share  Price; Market  Cap (9/1/99)
Products; Programs
DepoTech Corp.
(NASDAQ:DEPO)
9/28/95;
$12.00;
$135M
Acquired
Acquired by SkyePharma plc for $50M in stock (10/98-3/99)
N/A
DepoCyt (FDA-approved 4/99)
Myriad Genetics Inc.
(NASDAQ:MYGN)
10/5/95;
$18.00;
$163M
Unchanged
N/A
$12.13;
$114.1M
BRCA1 and 2 genetic test (launched 10/96); CardiaRISK AGT genetic test (launched 1/98)
Sonus Pharmaceuticals Inc.
(NASDAQ:SNUS)
10/12/95;
$7.00;
$60M
Unchanged
N/A
$4.06;
$36.5M
EchoGen (approved in European Union 7/98); FDA approval pending (approvable letter received 4/99)
Gliatech Inc.
(NASDAQ:GLIA)
10/18/95;
$9.50;
$67M
Unchanged
N/A
$20.06;
$194.1M
Adcol-L (FDA-approved 5/98)


"Our original business focus was three-fold," explained Kevin Heyeck, Pharmacopeia's director of business development. First, the company intended to lease its combinatorial libraries of diverse small molecule compounds to partners for their screening. Second, Pharmacopeia was going to license the active compounds discovered by its partners. And third, "we also got involved in full drug discovery collaborations almost from the outset. Partners gave us their targets and we gave them back development candidates," he said.

Then, shortly after the company went public, it started a fourth effort -- and that was to invest in its own drug discovery programs. If it proved out, this approach would add greater value to the company's bottom line. Taken together, the business plan represented "a fairly spread risk approach," Heyeck explained. "Out-licensing was short-term, low risk. Collaborations were medium-term, higher risk and internal drug discovery programs were high-risk ventures that would bring a higher return."

Despite the sophisticated business plan, however, the emphasis at Pharmacopeia "in the early days was on library out-licensing," Heyeck said. "We used our technology to create libraries of custom-designed compounds for our partners, which we then leased to those partners. The partners would identify a lead compound and then we would license that compound to them. The libraries came back to use for our own use." Plus, Pharmacopeia started to earn some revenue through milestone payments and licensing fees.



But drug discovery collaborations were also underway. "Even prior to going public we had already signed two full drug discovery collaborations." Those included a deal with Schering-Plough Corp. signed in December 1994, that centered on discovering new small molecule leads for cancer and asthma. The original collaboration between the two was valued at up to $75 million in pre-commercialization payments, including a $14 million equity investment. The partners have extended this collaboration numerous times, adding a specific target in hepatitis to the list in September 1997. (The two companies signed a new research collaboration in November 1998, as well.)

The second pre-IPO deal was with Berlex Laboratories Inc. (a subsidiary of the German drug company Schering AG). This agreement, signed in February 1995, was centered on screening for new drug leads for treating inflammation and autoimmune disorders. Berlex, which bought about $2.5 million worth of shares in Pharmacopeia's IPO, extended the collaboration when a promising lead emerged.

"Schering-Plough gave us two targets to develop, optimize and hand back. Over the last few years, this type of activity [and not limited to the Schering-Plough arrangement] has constituted a significant part of our business activity," Heyeck said.

Pharmacopeia Logo
But then the balance of activities within the company began to shift. "In the early days, on a revenue basis, about 60 percent was coming from collaborations and 40 percent from library out-licensing." But by the end of 1997, only 20 percent was coming from out-licensing, while 70 percent came from collaborations and 10 percent from internal drug discovery programs." Pharmacopeia's first corporate partner for its internal drug discovery programs was Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., he continued, which signed a deal in December 1997 to identify and optimize drug candidates for two chemokine receptors related to inflammatory and immulogical diseases.


Lead discovery is one of Pharmacopeia's selling points, too, and it intends to sign a lot more partnerships in this area. "The use of combinatorial chemistry for lead discovery hasn't happened in the industry," Heyeck claimed. Even in big pharma companies with internal programs, "By and large, combinatorial chemistry is employed to assist in lead optimization, not discovery," he added.

Company
IPO Date; 
Share (Unit) Price; Post-IPO Market Cap
Current Status
Details
Current Share 
Price; Market 
Cap (9/1/99)
Products; Programs
Pharmacyclics Inc.
(NASDAQ:PCYC)
10/24/95;
$12.00;
$101M
Unchanged
N/A
$28.13;
$348.6M
Drug candidates Xcytrin and Lutrin in Phase II clinical trials; drug candidate Antrin in Phase I trial
Cytoclonal Pharmaceutics Inc.
(NASDAQ:CYPH)
11/2/95;
$5.00 (unit);
$38M
Unchanged
N/A
$7.00;
$72.1M
Production of paclitaxel by fermentation
GelTex Pharmaceuticals Inc.
(NASDAQ:GELX)
11/8/95;
$10.00;
$100M
Acquired SunPharm Inc.
See SunPharm (above)
$13.94;
$234.8M
Renagel (FDA-approved 10/98); Cholestagel (NDA submitted 7/99)
Parexel International Corp. (NASDAQ:PRXL)
11/22/95;
$15.00;
$104M
Unchanged
N/A
$10.00;
$251M
Terminated merger agreement with Covance Inc. (6/99)



But it wasn't until June 1998, when Pharmacopeia completed its acquisition of Molecular Simulations Inc. (MSI), that the company experienced its own paradigm shift. "The acquisition of Molecular Simulations expanded the fundamentals of the business, both top-line and bottom-line growth," Heyeck explained. "In the long run we needed much better tools that would become an integral part of the drug discovery process," he added -- and MSI had a box-full of molecular modeling, simulation and informatics software tools that were highly complementary to Pharmacopeia's combinatorial chemistry and high-throughput screening skills. "We're clearly benefiting from the acquisition," Heyeck explained. For instance, the company is developing new tools in predictive pharmacology. As well, the MSI sales force is "very helpful in bringing Pharmacopeia to the outside world. They've gotten us in the doors of our customer base in a much more effective way."

The acquisition has already contributed substantially to Pharmacopeia's revenue growth, too; it's so good, said Heyeck, that it "should allow us to be profitable this year." Indeed, the company's total revenues for the second quarter of 1999 were $23.3 million, 15 percent higher than they had been in the year-ago period. This included a 23 percent increase in software segment revenue in the U.S. and Europe (i.e., Molecular Simulations' contribution). Pharmacopeia's partnering revenues have been solid, too. (For a comparison of how Pharmacopeia stacks up against the other chemistry companies, see Recombinant Capital's analysis of earned alliance revenues for the first quarter of 1999.)

One day, Pharmacopeia might be able to report royalties from product sales by its big pharma partners. That goal is becoming more tangible these days: "We’ve handed over six products to our pharmaceutical partners in the last five years," Heyeck said. "The first could go into the clinic next year."


Myriad Genetics, founded in 1991 and one of the first genomics companies, set out to discover disease genes and their biological pathways. It's found some important genes, all right -- for breast cancer, ovarian cancer, melanoma, brain cancer and heart disease -- but the biological pathways are just now beginning to yield their secrets.

Today, the company's got a series of potentially lucrative gene discovery and drug development alliances with pharmaceutical partners and ProNet, a proteomics technology for identifying drug targets, that's providing nearer-term revenues. Plus, Myriad already has two income-generating products -- in the form of genetic testing services -- a claim that few biotechs can match, even today.

Yet, even in its earliest days, well before its October 1995 IPO, the Salt Lake City firm's strategy was to look beyond the discovery of genes toward a viable business model. "We asked, 'How can we generate revenues from the information coming out of the human genome project?'" explained Peter Meldrum, a company founder and its president and CEO. Myriad's board of directors had some guidance on this issue and helped set the company's direction to develop both therapeutic and diagnostic applications from genetic information. "Our chairman, John Horan, advised us about the risk and expense of developing therapeutic products," Meldrum explained. Horan, the former chairman and CEO of Merck & Co. Inc., offered this sage advice: "If you want to be a FIPCO (fully integrated pharmaceutical company) and you want to beat the odds, you have to have 10 drugs in clinical trials and hope one works." Because the cost of doing this is overwhelming, Meldrum continued, "by the time we went public in 1995, our strategy in the therapeutic arena was to form alliances with pharmaceutical companies and use our research to identify targets. Big pharma would fund the risk and do the clinical trials. This turned out to be a very good strategy," he said. "We've had eight alliances with six different companies. Together, they add up to about $350 million in upfront payments, research funding and milestone payments."

Company
IPO Date; 
Share (Unit) Price; Post-IPO Market Cap
Current Status
Details
Current Share Price; Market  Cap (9/1/99)
Products; Programs
PathoGenesis Corp.
(NASDAQ:PGNS)
11/22/95;
$10.00;
$107M
Unchanged
N/A
$17.56;
$287.9M
TOBI (FDA-approved 12/97; approved in Canada and Argentina 2/99)
Pharmacopeia Inc. (NASDAQ:PCOP)
12/5/95;
$16.00;
$158M
Acquired Molecular Simulations Inc.
Pharmacopeia issued $130M in new stock to acquire Molecular Simulations (2/98-6/98)
$12.25;
$240.3M
Commercial revenues from software (Molecular Simulations)
Molecular Devices Corp.
(NASDAQ:MDCC)
12/12/95;
$11.00;
$88M
Unchanged.
N/A
$27.00;
$258.1M
Commercial revenues from bioanalytical measurement systems
Synaptic Pharmaceutical Corp.
(NASDAQ:SNAP)
12/13/95;
$12.50;
$107M
Unchanged
N/A
$7.63;
$81.9M
Partnering revenues only


Back in 1995, "We also saw a unique opportunity emerging in diagnostics," Meldrum continued. Aided by insights from another of its board members, former FDA commissioner Arthur Hayes, Jr., Myriad grabbed the chance to capitalize on the basic shift that was occurring in the practice of medicine -- from reactionary to preventative. "At all levels, from physician to HMO (and now drug companies), the approach was becoming proactive. But to prevent a particular disease, we need to be able to identify the subset of the population that's at risk," Meldrum said. Thus was born Myriad's diagnostics strategy -- one that has already resulted in two commercial products, genetic testing services for assessing the risk of breast and ovarian cancer and for evaluating genetic predisposition to cardiovascular disease.

"When we launched our first genetic testing service, BRACAnalysis, in the fall of 1996, no insurance companies would reimburse the $2,400 cost. And there was a tremendous amount of education that needed to be done for physicians. Now, the test is covered by almost every major insurance company and HMO, and the test has been embraced by physicians," he explained. And this broad acceptance of genetic testing has had a major impact on Myriad's earnings: for the year ended June 30, 1999, the company reported genetic testing revenue of $5.2 million, 136 percent higher than it had been the previous year. (The second test, CardiaRISK AGT, was launched in January 1998.) "Sales are growing by 25 percent per quarter," Meldrum added.

Myriad Logo
"As the diagnostic component of Myriad Genetics grows and moves toward profitability, it's appropriate for us to reassess our strategy and look for new opportunities to create shareholder value," he continued. "Now we're shifting back to therapeutics." Indeed, just this spring, Myriad created a new subsidiary, Myriad Pharmaceuticals Inc., to develop lead compounds for selected common diseases. The unit will use drug targets discovered with Myriad's proteomics technology ProNet and develop them into fully validated lead candidates, ready for clinical trials -- and for partnering with companies that can take them the rest of the way. So far, Myriad Pharmaceuticals has identified six targets in cancer, central nervous system and inflammation, he added. "We're in the process of high-throughput screening to identify a series of lead compounds." This strategy should create significant added value without the risk associated with clinical trials and drug approvals, Meldrum said.



Thus, Myriad Genetics' business strategy has evolved in parallel with new advances in technology. "In 1995, our focus was on genomics and the discovery of genes. Then, we realized that we had to understand the function of genes and their role in the disease state," he explained. "That moved us more into functional genomics and proteomics. ProNet is a result of Myriad Genetics' continued technical evolution to keep the company competitive. And this is reflected by our strategic alliances, several of which have been signed in the last six to nine months," Meldrum said. "The company's goal today is not just to discover genes but to identify highly validated drug targets based on our genomics and proteomics research." And, of course, this focus will still create diagnostic opportunities -- which in turn should generate near-term revenues.


All of the companies detailed here rode into the public's awareness on the back of one of the biggest financing waves in biotech's recent history. Yet, none has done remarkably well -- if stock performance and market cap are the criteria. Nor would any of them wow Wall Street on the earnings front. They also experienced -- and lived through -- the severe financing crisis that has engulfed the biotech industry of late. That crisis -- coupled with a range of other difficulties -- has caused the demise of six of the original class of 20. But the others remain. Their survival strategies are a lesson to all, especially companies that might yet join the IPO class of 1999 -- or 2000.


Copyright © 2013. Signals (signalsmag.com) is an online magazine of analysis for biotechnology executives. To contact the Signals editorial department, send e-mail to signals_edit@deloitte.com. Signals is published by: Recap, 2033 N Main Street, Suite 1050 , Walnut Creek, California 94596-3722, Phone: (925) 952-3870